State v. King Respondent\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 44110 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-11-2016
State v. King Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 44110
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. King Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 44110" (2016). Not Reported. 3263.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3263
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 






























BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON  
________________________ 
 





LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 







Canyon County Public 
Defender’s Office 
111 N. 11th Ave., Ste. 120 
Caldwell, Idaho  83605 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1 
 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 3 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4 
 
 The District Court Erred By Reversing The Magistrate’s 
 Ruling On The Motion To Suppress Because The Facts 
 Supported The Magistrate’s Conclusion That There Was 
 Reasonable Suspicion To Believe King Was Driving Under 
 The Influence And Because There Was Reasonable 
 Suspicion That She Was Driving Inattentively ............................................ 4 
 
 A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5 
 
 C. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal 
  Standard When It Required Suspicion Of An 
  Illegality In Addition To DUI To Conduct A Traffic 
  Stop ................................................................................................. 5 
 
 D. The District Court Also Erred When It Concluded 
  That Sergeant Lathrop Lacked Reasonable 
  Suspicion Of Inattentive Driving ...................................................... 8 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 11 
 






TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 958 P.2d 592 (1998) ....................................... 9, 10 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ............................................................ 5 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) .............................................................. 5, 6 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .................................. 5 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996) ........................ 7 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) .................................... 5, 6 
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2001) .......................... 7 
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 283 P.3d 722 (2012) ......................................... 7 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................. 5 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) .............................................. 5 
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................... 7 
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................. 6 
 
State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 15 P.3d 334 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................ 7 
State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 798 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990) .............................. 8 
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 362 P.3d 514 (2015) .............................................. 6 
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004) ................................... 8 
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 88 P.3d 1220 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................... 6 
State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 167 P.3d 783 (Ct. App. 2006) ......................... 5, 6 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) ....................................................... 7 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) ................................................... 6, 8 
Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 32 P.3d 164 




I.C. § 49-1401(3) ............................................................................................. 9, 10 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 







STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s reversal of the magistrate’s 
order denying Jessica Lynn King’s motion to suppress evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state cited King for second offense misdemeanor DUI.  (R., pp. 5-6.)  
She moved to suppress “evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained.”  
(R., p. 15.)  The basis for the motion was a claim that the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.  (R,. pp. 17-22, 26-27.) 
At the hearing on the motion Patrol Sergeant Lathrop testified that he was 
on patrol at about 2:45 a.m. when he observed a car with “its left turn signal on 
going through intersections.”  (Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L.14.)  Sergeant Lathrop 
testified it went through three intersections before he “pulled it over” as it turned 
left at the fourth intersection.  (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 15-25; p. 10, Ls. 18-22.)  Sergeant 
Lathrop concluded driving through three intersections with the turn signal on was 
concerning, not normal, and indicated to him in his professional experience that 
the driver might be intoxicated.  (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1-22; p. 12, Ls. 7-13; p. 12, L. 21 – 
p. 13, L. 9.)   
The magistrate concluded that King’s driving pattern under the totality of 
the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion she was driving under the 
influence.  (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22, L. 7.)  Thereafter King entered a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge.  (Tr., p. 23, L. 6 – p. 28, L. 21.)  King thereafter filed a 
2 
 
notice of appeal to the district court, timely from the entry of judgment. 
(R., pp. 30, 31.) 
The district court reversed the order denying suppression, concluding that 
the facts did not support reasonable suspicion of DUI and also concluding that 
driving through three intersections with a turn signal on but not turning was not 
reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving.  (R., pp. 73-81.)  The state filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision.  








 Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate’s ruling on the motion 
to suppress because the facts supported the magistrate’s conclusion that there 
was reasonable suspicion to believe King was driving under the influence and 










The District Court Erred By Reversing The Magistrate’s Ruling On The Motion To 
Suppress Because The Facts Supported The Magistrate’s Conclusion That 
There Was Reasonable Suspicion To Believe King Was Driving Under The 





 Sergeant Lathrop testified that King drove through three intersections with 
her left turn signal on at 2:45 in the morning, and then turned left as he pulled her 
over.  (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-21.)  The magistrate found that she went through “at least 
two” intersections with her turn signal on and that “the officer in his 16 years of 
experience found that to be indicative of someone that might be under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol while driving, [at] that time of night.”  (Tr., p. 20, 
L. 20 – p. 21, L. 19.)  On appeal, however, the district court reversed.1  It first 
concluded that “driving patterns that are merely unusual or irregular but not illegal 
do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic stop,” and therefore there was no 
reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI.  (R., p. 76.)  This analysis applies an 
incorrect legal standard because reasonable suspicion of DUI does not require 
an “illegal” driving pattern.  The district court also held that driving through 
multiple intersections with a turn signal on did not constitute reasonable 
suspicion of inattentive driving.  (R., pp. 76-81.)  This analysis is error because it 
is directly contrary to applicable Idaho Supreme Court precedent.   
                                            
1 The district court incorrectly stated the facts.  The district court stated King 
drove through two intersections with her turn signal on without turning. 
(R., p. 74.)  The trial court found it was “at least two” intersections (Tr., p. 20, 




B. Standard Of Review 
 
 On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts.  State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
 
C. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal Standard When It Required 
Suspicion Of An Illegality In Addition To DUI To Conduct A Traffic Stop 
 
 “A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
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about to commit, a crime.  Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 
203 P.3d at 1210.  “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible 
criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is 
being driven contrary to traffic laws.”  Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 
(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).  “Reasonable suspicion 
requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the 
part of the officer.”  State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).  Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 
1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 The district court did not apply this standard to determine whether 
Sergeant Lathrop properly stopped King for suspicion of DUI.  The district court 
required evidence of an “illegal” driving pattern rather than mere evidence that 
King was driving under the influence, but otherwise legally.  (R., p. 76.)  This 
application of an erroneous legal standard led to an erroneous reversal of the 
magistrate’s finding of reasonable suspicion.  The Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically stated “there are two possible justifications for a traffic stop—the 
officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed an offense, such as 
a traffic offense, or the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, 
such as driving under the influence.”  State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442, 
362 P.3d 514, 517 (2015).  The magistrate’s determination of reasonable 
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suspicion of DUI justified the stop even without evidence that King was otherwise 
driving illegally. 
 Moreover, cases holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a 
motorist for DUI even though no other traffic violations were observed are 
numerous.  Examples include State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), where the Court of Appeals held that a “weaving 
pattern, with the vehicle three times touching the lines on edges of the lane, was 
not within the range of normal driving behavior and was an objective indication 
that the driver was impaired.”  See also State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208-09, 
953 P.2d 645, 648-49 (Ct. App. 1998).  Also, in Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 
136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d 164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001), the officer had reasonable 
suspicion of DUI even though no driving pattern was known to him, but a citizen 
called police with information that Wilson had left a residence under the influence 
in a specific vehicle.  See also State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d 
334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2000).  Indeed, it is well established that “the existence of 
alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable 
suspicion.”  State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012) 
(citations omitted). See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-276 
(2002); State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(“a series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant 
further investigation when viewed together” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 In this case King drove through multiple intersections with her turn signal 
on without turning.  The magistrate determined that, at that time of night (it was 
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2:45 a.m.), an officer with Sergeant Lathrop’s experience (16 years) could 
reasonably suspect that she was under the influence.  (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22, 
L. 7.)  This determination was based on application of the correct legal standards 
as stated above.  See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) 
(“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions – inferences and 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 
176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004) (“An officer may draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be 
drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.”); State v. 
Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) (“An officer’s 
training and experience often play a role in pinpointing facts and circumstances 
that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot.”).  Because the 
district court applied an erroneous legal standard, it erred by reversing the 
magistrate who had applied the correct legal standard.  Application of the 
relevant legal standards shows that King’s driving pattern was suspicious, not 
normal, and that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that King was 
driving under the influence.  
 
D. The District Court Also Erred When It Concluded That Sergeant Lathrop 
Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Of Inattentive Driving 
 
 Addressing whether Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable suspicion above 
and beyond his suspicion of DUI, the district court reviewed whether Sergeant 
Lathrop had reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving, concluding he did not.  
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(R., pp. 76-81.) Applying the legal standards set forth above shows the district 
court also erred in this analysis. 
 The elements of inattentive driving are as follows: 
1. On or about [date], 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant [name] drove or was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle 
4. upon a highway, or upon public or private property open to the 
public, and 
5. the defendant drove the vehicle in an inattentive, careless or 
imprudent manner, in light of the circumstances then existing, 
rather than heedless or wanton, or drove in a manner where the 
danger to persons or property from the defendant’s conduct was 
slight. 
 
I.C.J.I. 1031.  See also I.C. § 49-1401(3).  That Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable 
suspicion of the first four elements of this offense is undisputed.  The only 
question is whether Sergeant Lathrop had more than a hunch that King was 
driving “in an inattentive, careless or imprudent manner, in light of the 
circumstances then existing” or if she created a “slight” “danger to persons or 
property.”   
 The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that driving through multiple 
intersections signaling an intent to turn but not turning constitutes reasonable 
suspicion of inattentive driving.  Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 435, 958 P.2d 
592, 592 (1998). The facts of that case were as follows: “About midnight on 
October 27, 1996, a Boise City police officer (the officer) stopped a vehicle being 
driven west on Bond Street in Boise by Trudy M. Deen (Deen) after observing 
Deen activate her right-hand turn signal and then fail to make the indicated right-
hand turn at three consecutive intersections.”  Id. at 435, 958 P.2d at 592.  The 
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Court held: “Deen’s conduct in activating her turn indicator and then leaving it 
flashing while she drove through three consecutive intersections provided the 
officer with reasonable and articulable suspicion that Deen was engaged in 
inattentive driving, which is a violation of the motor vehicle code. I.C. § 49-
1401(3).”  Id. at 436, 958 P.2d at 593.  This precedent is on point and controlling; 
the district court erred by not following it. 
 The district court attempted to distinguish Deen on the basis that, unlike 
Deen, King eventually made the signaled turn:    
However, the instant case is distinguishable from Deen on its facts. 
The driver in Deen never turned; King completed the signaled turn 
in this case. The most that can be said about the instant case, then, 
is that King activated her turn signal, delayed the turn for two 
blocks, then completed the turn as signaled without incident. King 
contends as soon as she made the turn, any basis for charging 
inattentive driving that may have existed under the theory of Deen 
became fully dissipated. In other words, addition of the fact of the 
completed turn to the chronology means that the circumstance of 
the activated turn signal, standing alone, no longer gives rise to any 
reasonable basis for suspicion of inattentive driving. It simply 
becomes an early turn signal followed by a completed turn without 
incident, which at any hour of the day is a common, ordinary 
occurrence without any element of wrongdoing. 
 
(R., p. 80.)  This analysis is flawed, however. That King was attentive on the 
fourth intersection did not make her any less inattentive for the first three.  
Reasonable suspicion that she had been inattentive by driving through three 
intersections signaling a turn but not turning was not “dissipated” by a proper turn 
later accomplished. 
 King signaled an intent to turn at three intersections, but did not turn. Such 
signaling, but failing to turn as signaled, indicated to an experienced officer that 
she was under the influence or otherwise inattentive to her driving.  The 
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magistrate correctly concluded that the traffic stop was justified, and the district 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and 
reinstate the judgment of the magistrate. 
 DATED this 11th day of October, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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